Has Al Qaeda sowed the seeds of its own demise?

Peter Bergen argues that they have

Is al-Qaeda simply going to wither away? Yes, with a little help, though not in the short term. History shows that small, violent groups can sustain their bloody work for years on end with virtually no public support. However, embedded in the DNA of groups such as al-Qaeda are the seeds of their own destruction.

To begin with, al-Qaeda and allied groups have launched terrorist campaigns from Iraq to Indonesia that have killed thousands of Muslim civilians. For groups that claim to be defending Muslims, this is not an impressive achievement. It is a particular problem for al-Qaeda, with its claim to the Islamist high ground, because the Koran specifically forbids the killing of civilians and the killing of Muslims. In Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda lost a great deal of support after a campaign of attacks in 2003 that killed mostly Saudis. Saudi society, which had once been a cheerleader for bin Laden, turned against him. By 2007, only 10 percent of Saudis had a favorable view of al-Qaeda. In Pakistan, where bin Laden is presumably hiding out, his popularity is down to 18 percent, compared with 52 percent five years ago. Key Muslim clerics have formally withdrawn their endorsements.

At the same time, al-Qaeda and its allies—in contrast, for instance, to Hezbollah—do not offer a positive vision of the future. We know what bin Laden is against. What is he for?Ordinary Muslims ask themselves this same question. There are no al-Qaeda social-welfare services or schools. An al-Qaeda hospital is a sinister oxymoron. If you were to ask bin Laden, he would say that al-Qaeda seeks the restoration of “the caliphate.” By this he does not mean the restoration of something like the last caliphate—the Ottoman Empire, a relatively pluralistic polity—but rather the imposition of Taliban-style theocracies in a broad belt from Africa to Asia. Many Muslims may admire bin Laden because he “stood up” to the West, but that does not mean they want to live in his grim Islamist utopia. They do not.

Finally, the jihadist militants are incapable of turning themselves into a genuine mass political movement because their ideology prevents them from making the kind of real-world compromises that would allow them to engage in normal politics. Indeed, rather than cut deals with new friends, bin Laden has kept adding to his list of enemies, including any Muslim who doesn’t precisely share his ultra-fundamentalist worldview. The enemies list grows and grows. Al-Qaeda has said it is opposed to all Middle Eastern regimes; the Shia; most Western countries; Jews and Christians; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; most humanitarian organizations; and the United Nations. This is no way to increase market share.

Mr. Bergen also makes the point that I posted earlier today:

Third, citizens in the West must come to understand—and their leaders must drive the point home—that although terrorist attacks, including attacks by al-Qaeda, will continue to happen, the real damage is done by the panic and lashing out that follows. This is the reaction that al-Qaeda craves—and it is why terrorism works. It’s easy to understand the emergence of a culture of paranoia coupled with a rhetoric of vengeance. Prudence, calmness, and patience seem almost pusillanimous by comparison. But they work. Rare is the threat that can be defeated in large measure simply by deciding that we will not unduly fear it. Terrorism is one such threat.